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Abstract—Wireless social community networks formed by
users with a WiFi access point have been created as an alternative
to traditional wireless networks that operate in the licensed
spectrum. By relying on access points owned by users for access,
wireless community networks provide a wireless infrastructure
in an inexpensive way. However, the coverage of such a network
is limited by the set of users who open their access points to the
social community. Currently, it is not clear to what degree this
paradigm can serve as a replacement, or a complimentary service,
of existing centralized networks operating in licensed bands. In
this paper, we study the dynamics of wireless social community
networks using, as well as the situation where a wireless social
community networks co-exists with a traditional wireless network
operating in the licensed spectrum.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless social community networks have been created as
an alternative to wireless networks that operate in the licensed
spectrum for providing wireless data access in urban areas.
Traditionally, wireless networks have been operated using li-
censed spectrum and have been operated by a central authority.
Such networks can guarantee a high quality of service (QoS) in
terms of network coverage; however this comes at the expense
of substantial deployment and maintenance costs. Wireless
social community networks operate in the unlicensed spectrum
and rely on users having a WiFi access point to provide access.
Thus, there is no need for an operator to make substantial
initial investment to buy the spectrum license. Furthermore,
the access points (AP) are inexpensive, easy to deploy and
maintain. However, wireless social community might have a
poor coverage as the coverage depends on number of users
that subscribe to the social community network.
In this paper, we study how effective wireless social com-
munities networks are. We are in particular interested in the
case where a wireless social community networks competes
with traditional a licensed band network. To do this, we ﬁrst
investigate how users decide whether or not to join the social
community network, and study the evolution of the number
of members in the community by modeling users’ payoffs as
a function of the subscription fee1, as well as the operators’
provided coverage. Next, we study the competition between a
social community operator and a wireless network operating
in the licensed spectrum using a game-theoretic framework.
1Note that the subscription fee corresponds to the price users have to pay.
Hence, we use the two terms interchangeably in the paper.
For the resulting non-cooperative game, we investigate the
existence a Nash equilibrium, and characterize the number of
users that subscribe to each service provider under a Nash
equilibrium. Due to space constraints we present our results
without proof and will focus at several instances on particular
special cases, as discussed in the following.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider two network operators, a traditional licensed band
operator (LBO or ) and social community operators (SCO or
s), that compete for providing access in a given area to a set
of N users. Each provider charges a subscription fee Pi, i ∈
{l, s}. Users decided at discrete time instances t = 1, 2, ... to
which provider they subscribe. If a user subscribes to provider
i, i ∈ {l, s}, then the user pays a subscription fee Pi[t] at time
t. Let ns[t] be the fraction of users that subscribes to the SCO,
and let nl[t] be the fraction for users subscribing to the LBO.
Let Ql and Qs be the network coverage that the LBO and
SCO, respectively, provide. In the following we assume that
the LBO always provides full coverage and all users that
subscribe to the LBO always have access to a base station,
i.e we have that Ql[t] = 1, t ≥ 0. On the other hand, the
coverage Qs[t] provided by the SCO at time t depends on the
number of users ns[t] that subscribe to the SCO. Here, we use
the following simple relation to model this situation: we let
Qs[t] = min{1, λns[t]},
where λ > 0 is a positive constant modeling the density of the
access points owned by users (see also Fig. 1). For example,
a large λ captures the case where access points are very dense
as it might be the case in a city center. Given the subscription
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Fig. 1. Relation between fraction of subscribers ns and the social community
coverage Qs: (a) 0 < λ ≤ 1, (b) 1 < λ.
Int. Zurich Seminar on Communications (IZS), March 12-14, 2008
22978-1-4244-1682-0/08/$25.00 ©2008 IEEE
Authorized licensed use limited to: EPFL LAUSANNE. Downloaded on March 01,2010 at 06:14:31 EST from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
fee Pi and coverage Qi of a provider i ∈ {l, s}, the utility that
a given user v obtains by subscribing to provider i is given by
uiv = avQi − Pi, (1)
where av is a non-negative parameter that characterizes the
user sensitivity with respect to coverage. User v only considers
subscribing to provider i if the resulting utility uiv is non-
negative.
In the following we assume a large user population and that
the users’ sensitivity towards coverage is uniformly distributed
in [α, β], α ≥ 0. As a result, we let the fraction of users with
a sensitivity towards coverage that is larger than a given value
x ∈ [α, β] be given by β−xβ−α .
The payoff of operator i, i ∈ {, s}, at time t is given by
ui[t] = N · ni[t] · Pi − ci, i ∈ {, s}, (2)
where Nni[t] is the total number of users subscribing to
provider i at time t and ci is the operating cost of provider i
per unit time slot.
III. RELATED WORK
The wireless community networks over unlicensed band
have been recently deployed by some ISPs such as Free [4]
in France or FON, a worldwide WiFi community operator
funded by Google and Skype [3]. A charging model for
wireless social community networks without a centralized
authority is proposed by Efstathiou et al. [5]. Their solution
relies on reciprocity among subscribers. In [6], Zemlianov and
de Veciana evaluate using a stochastic geometric model, the
cooperation between licensed band WAN and WLAN service
providers. A complete evaluation of our model for λ = 1 is
presented in [7].
IV. OPTIMAL PRICING STRATEGY OF LBO
Consider the situation where the LBO is the only wireless
access provider in a given area. For this case we are interested
in determining the optimal price P ∗l , that the LBO should
charge per unit time in order to maximize its revenue. Note
that under a given price Pl, only user for which the payoff ulv
given by Eq. (1) is non-negative subscribes to the LBO, and
the fraction of users nl that subscribes to the LBO under the
price Pl is given by
n =
1
β − α (β −max{α, P}) . (3)
The resulting payoff of the LBO is given by
u =
N
β − α (β −max{α, P}) · P − c (4)
The following lemma shows the optimal price of LBO.
Lemma 1: The optimal price P ∗l is given by
P opt = max{α,
β
2
}. (5)
The fraction of users n∗l that subscribes to the LBO under the
price P ∗l is given by
n∗l = max{1,
1
2
β
β − α}.
V. OPTIMAL PRICING STRATEGY OF SCO
Next we consider the situation where the SBO is the only
wireless provider in a given area. For this case, we are again
interested in determining the optimal price P ∗s the SCO should
charge per unit time in order to maximize its revenue. Here
we assume that at time t users observe the coverage Qs(t−1)
at time t − 1 and the subscription fee Ps[t] at time t. Using
this information, a user v then subscribes to the SCO if
usv[t] = avQs(t− 1)− Ps[t] ≥ 0.
Under a ﬁxed price Ps[t] = Ps, t ≥ 0, the fraction of
users ns[t] that subscribe to the SCO at time t, and hence the
coverage Qs[t] of the SCO at time t, is then a function of the
coverage Qs(t−1) at the previous time step. In particular, we
have that
Qs[t] = min{1, λ
β − α (β −max{α,
Ps
Qs[t− 1]})}
In the following, we study (a) how the coverage Qs[t]
evolves over time under a ﬁxed price Ps and (b) what price
P ∗s the SCO should charge in order to maximize its revenue.
For this analysis, we focus on the case where λ ∈ (0, 2) and
β ≥ 22−λα. The analysis, and system behavior, for the general
case is similar to this situation. Before we start our analysis,
we observe the following results.
Lemma 2: If Qs[0] = 0 and Ps[t] = Ps > 0, t ≥ 0, then
we have that Qs[t] = 0, t ≥ 0.
Lemma 3: If Ps[t] = Ps > 0, t ≥ 0, and PsQs[0] ≤ α then
Qs[t] = min{1, λ}, t ≥ 0.
A. Dynamics of the SCO under a Fixed Price Ps
In this subsection we assume that the SCO charges a ﬁxed
price Ps and study for this case how the coverage Qs[t] evolves
as a function of the initial coverage Qs[0].
Let Qs,1 and Qs,2 be given as follows,
Qs,1 =
βλ−√β2λ2 − 4(β − α)Psλ
2(β − α)
and
Qs,2 =
βλ +
√
β2λ2 − 4(β − α)Psλ
2(β − α) .
The following results characterize the dynamics of the cover-
age Qs[t] for the above case. In our analysis, we distinguish
different cases depending on the price Ps (see also Fig. 2).
We ﬁrst consider the case where the price Ps is low.
Lemma 4: Suppose that
Ps ∈ [0, β − 1
λ
(β − α)].
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If Qs[0] < Qs,1 then limt→∞Qs[t] = 0; otherwise
limt→∞Qs[t] = min{1, λ}.
The next result is for the case where the price Ps is higher
than β − 1λ (β − α) but smaller than β
2λ
4(β−α) .
Lemma 5: Suppose that
β − 1
λ
(β − α) < Ps < β
2λ
4(β − α) .
If Qs[0] < Qs,1 then we have that limt→∞Qs[t] = 0. If
Qs[0] > Qs,1 then limt→∞Qs[t] = Qs,2. Finally, if Qs[0] =
Qs,1 then we have Qs[t] = Qs,1, t ≥ 0.
The third case is the situation where the price Ps is exactly
equal to β
2λ
4(β−α) .
Lemma 6: Suppose that
Ps =
β2λ
4(β − α) .
If Qs[0] < Qs,1 then limt→∞Qs[t] = 0. If Qs[0] ≥ Qs,1 then
limt→∞Qs[t] = Qs,1 = Qs,2 = βλ2(β−α) .
Finally, we consider the case where Ps is high, i.e. if Ps is
larger than β
2λ
4(β−α) .
Lemma 7: If
Ps >
β2λ
4(β − α)
then we have that limt→∞Qs[t] = 0.
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Fig. 2. Dynamics of SCO for λ < 2 and β ≥ 2
2−λα : (a) 0 < Ps ≤
β − 1
λ
(β − α), (b) β − 1
λ
(β − α) < Ps < β
2λ
4(β−α) , (c) Ps =
β2λ
4(β−α) , (d)
Ps >
β2λ
4(β−α) .
The above results imply that given the initial coverage Q[0]
and a ﬁxed subscription fee Ps, the fraction of users that
subscribe to the social community network converges to a
well-deﬁned limit point: let ns(Qs[0], Ps) denote this limit
point.
B. Optimal Static Price
Let ns(Qs[0], Ps) the fraction of users that subscribe to the
SCO at the limit point corresponding to a given value of Q[0]
and Ps, and let
us(Qs[0], Ps) = Nns(Qs[0], Ps)Ps − ci
be the corresponding payoff. In this section, we characterize
the optimal price P ∗s that the SCO should charge in order to
maximize the payoff us(Qs[0], Ps) for a given initial coverage
Qs[0], i.e. we have
P ∗s = arg max
Ps≥0
us(Qs[0], Ps).
If the initial coverage Qs[0] is small, then we obtain the
following result.
Theorem 1: If we have that Qs[0] ≤ λ ββ−α − 1, then
P ∗s = Qs[0] · (β −
1
λ
(β − α) ·Qs[0])
and ns(Qs[0], P ∗s ) = 1.
Under Qs[0] and P ∗s in Theorem 1, the dynamics of the social
community is as given by Lemma 4 (see also Fig. 2 (a)).
Note that the optimal price P ∗s in Theorem 1 depends on
the initial coverage; the intuition behind this is that when the
initial coverage Qs[0] is small, then the SCO needs to choose a
subscription fee small enough in order to prevent the coverage
Qs[t] to converge to 0.
If the initial coverage is large, then we have the following
result.
Theorem 2: If Qs[0] > λ ββ−α − 1 and β < 3λα, then
P ∗s = β −
1
λ
(β − α)
and ns(Qs[0], P ∗s ) = 1.
If Qs[0] > λ ββ−α − 1 and β ≥ 3λα, then
P ∗s =
2λ
9
β2
(β − α)
and ns(Qs[0], P ∗s ) = 23
β
β−α .
Note that the optimal price P ∗s given in Theorem 2 depends on
α, β, and λ, but not on the initial coverage Qs[0]. If β < 3λα,
then under Qs[0] and P ∗s as in Theorem 1 the dynamics of the
social community is as given by Lemma 4 (see also Fig. 2
(a)). If β < 3λα, then under Qs[0] and P ∗s as in Theorem 1 the
dynamics of the social community is as given by Lemma 5
(see also Fig. 2 (b))
C. Optimal Dynamic Pricing Strategy
So far we assumed that the subscription fee that the SCO
charges is ﬁxed. Now suppose that the SCO can adjust the
subscription fee over time: in this case, how should the SCO
adapt its price in order to converge to an operating point that
maximizes its payoff? One can show that this following pricing
strategies achieve this.
If β < 3λα, then set the initial price Ps[0] = 0 and
afterwards charge
Ps[t] = β − 1
λ
(β − α), t ≥ 0.
If β ≥ 3λα, then set the initial price Ps[0] = 0 and afterword
charge
Ps[t] =
2λ
9
β2
(β − α) , t ≥ 0
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The intuition behind the above pricing strategies is that
setting the price Ps[0] equal to 0 will lead to ns[1] = 1
and to a large coverage at time 1. Once a large coverage has
been achieved, then the results in Theorem 2 can be used to
determine the optimal subscription fee.
VI. COMPETITION BETWEEN A SCO AND A LBO
Next we consider the situation where a LBO and SCO co-
exist in a given area, and compete for mobile users to subscribe
to their service. We model this situation as a non-cooperative
pricing game where two operators are the players [1]. The
operators compete through their subscription price and the the
strategy of operator i in the game is given by its price Pi.
Again we assume that users make decision at discrete time
steps t = 1, 2, · · · . Recall the deﬁnition of the utility uiv that
user v achieves when it subscribes to a provider i ∈ {l, s}.
Given subscription fees Pl and Ps, and observing the coverage
Qs[t− 1] of the SCO at time t− 1, user v will choose at time
t the provider i which leads to the largest utility uiv at time
t. Of course, user v will only subscribe to this provider if the
resulting utility is non-negative; otherwise the user will not
subscribe to any provider. Let nl[t] and ns[t] the resulting
fraction of users that subscribe to the LBO and the SCO,
respectively, at time t.
Given ﬁxed prices Pl and Ps, we call Qs(Pl, Ps) an equilib-
rium coverage if for Qs[0] = Qs(Pl, Ps) we have under Pl and
Ps that Qs[t] = Qs(Pl, Ps), t ≥ 0. Similarly, we deﬁne the
equilibrium markets shares nl(Pl, Ps) and ns(Pl, Ps), and the
corresponding equilibrium payoffs ul(Pl, Ps) and us(Ps, Pl)
of the LBO and the SCO, respectively. Using the above
deﬁnitions, a Nash equilibrium for the above game is given as
follows.
Deﬁnition 1: The price pair (P ∗l , P ∗s ) constitutes a Nash
equilibrium if for each operator i ∈ {l, s} we have
ui(P ∗i , P
∗
j ) ≥ ui(Pi, P ∗j ), ∀Pi ≥ 0. (6)
At a Nash equilibrium, none of the operators has an incentive
to unilaterally change its subscription fee as this will not
increase its payoff. In the following we study whether there
exists a Nash equilibrium for the above game. To simplify the
analysis, we assume that α = 0.
Theorem 3: Suppose that α = 0. If λ ∈ (0, 3) then there
exists a unique Nash equilibrium given by
(P ∗ , P
∗
s ) =
(
β
2
· 1−Q
∗
s
1− Q∗s4
,
βQ∗s
4
· 1−Q
∗
s
1− Q∗s4
)
(7)
where Q∗s = 2−
√
4− λ. The fraction of users that subscribe
to the SCO at the Nash equilibrium is given by n∗s = 1λQ
∗
s =
1
2+
√
4−λ , and the fraction of users that subscribe to the LBO
is given by n∗l = 22+√4−λ .
If λ ≥ 3, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium
(P ∗l = 0, P
∗
s = 0) with Qs(P ∗l , P ∗s ) = 1. However the
fraction of users that subscribe the each operator are not
uniquely determined. In particular, any market share n∗l and
n∗s such that n∗s ≥ 1/λ and n∗l + n∗s = 1 may be realized at a
Nash equilibrium.
The above analysis implies that there always exists a unique
Nash equilibrium. For λ ∈ (0, 3) the market share of each
provider is uniquely determined. Furthermore, for λ ∈ (0, 3),
we have that (a) the market share (i.e. the fraction of users that
subscribe to an operator) of both the LBO and SCO increase
as λ increases and (b) the market share of the LBO is always
twice as large as the market share of the SCO.
The subscription fees (P ∗l , P ∗s ) charged at a Nash equilib-
rium tend to decrease as λ increases. This suggests that the
SCO inﬂuences the pricing behavior of a LBO, and that the
presence of a SCO in area with a dense network of WiFi access
points might be able to signiﬁcantly reduce the fees charged
for wireless access.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have analyzed the competition between a
social community and licensed band operators using a game-
theoretic approach. We showed that there always exists a
unique a Nash equilibrium for the resulting non-cooperative
game, and characterized the number of users that subscribe to
each service provider under a Nash equilibrium.
The results that we obtained are intuitive, suggesting that
the simple model that we used for our analysis is indeed able
to capture the main features of the competition between a LBO
and SCO. As expected, the results suggest that a SCO tends to
successful in areas with a high density of access points owned
by users.
Possible future work is to consider more general distribution
for the users’ sensitivity towards coverage, as well as to take
interference effects into account that might occur when too
many users subscribe to the SCO.
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